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Abstract In the past few decades there has been an increased integration of com-
municable disease policies in Europe. The historical roots of this process date back 
to the mid- nineteenth century, when national authorities realized that the cross- 
boundary spread of diseases cannot be only a matter of national governance but 
requires common agreements and regulations. In the early 1950s the structuring of 
the World Health Organization in regional offices further contributed to the definition 
of Europe as a unit for risk assessments and international health cooperation. More 
recently the consolidation of the European Union has provided new institutional bases 
for shaping communicable disease policies at the supranational level. This article 
reviews these different attempts to protect the European space from diseases. It is 
argued that changing modes of communicable disease control have not only reflected 
shifts in public health priorities and institutional contexts but have also been impor-
tant loci where different understandings of Europe and European political identity 
emerged and were negotiated. Against this background the article then examines past 
achievements and future challenges of the current European framework and discusses 
implications for the wider process of European integration.
Communicable disease control has a peculiar political logic. Because of 
the transnational spread of diseases, prevention and control measures have 
long challenged existing concepts of territorial sovereignty and required 
international cooperation. At the same time, the ways governments and 
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health authorities collaborate are inevitably shaped by the context of inter-
national relations, institutional dynamics, and the broader landscape of 
political culture. The historical development of communicable disease 
policies in Europe is a good case in point. In many ways, changing modes 
of European cooperation in public health have reflected contingent mean-
ings of Europe and its relations with other parts of the world.
This article aims to shed some light on these issues by analyzing in his-
torical perspective different attempts to protect the European space from 
communicable diseases, starting with the early International Sanitary 
Conventions of the nineteenth century to the recent involvement of the 
European Union (EU). In particular, we review the development of insti-
tutional frameworks that have provided the basis for international collabo-
ration and how such processes have been affected by changes in political 
environments and shifting notions of European cooperation. Against this 
background, the second part of the article focuses on past achievements 
and future challenges of the current supranational system for communi-
cable disease control, identifying key issues that might arise as the EU 
expands its competencies in this policy area.
The Politics of Disease at the  
International Sanitary Conferences
Early efforts at international collaboration for communicable disease con-
trol in Europe date back to the nineteenth century and were prompted 
by the threat of cholera. This disease had long been endemic in India in 
the Bengal region and the Ganges river delta (Hays 2005). In the period 
1817 – 1824, however, the disease spread throughout India and then to many 
other areas in Asia and the Western Pacific. In 1827 a second pandemic 
again originated in the Bengal region, rapidly moving into the Russian 
Empire and from there to Prussia, France, England, and North America. 
A third pandemic wave hit Europe between 1848 and 1854. As the disease 
reached European cities, it took advantage of poor sanitation and unsafe 
water supply. About 61,000 people died In England in 1848 – 1849 and a 
further 26,000 in 1853 – 1854, 10,000 of those in London. In Paris 20,000 
died of cholera in 1849 (Hays 2005). Because of the high mortality rate 
and its dramatic symptoms, cholera profoundly affected European societ-
ies and challenged public order and stability. Moreover, the disease was 
widely perceived as a transnational threat. As a commentary published in 
1832 in the British periodical Quarterly Review noted, the disease “mas-
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tered every variety of climate, surmounted every natural obstacle, con-
quered every people” (Briggs 1961: 76)
In the face of this scourge, European governments initially responded 
with traditional containment measures. Since the Black Death of the 
fourteenth century, quarantine had been the standard policy for infec-
tious disease control. Quarantine required ships coming from suspected 
or infected sites to stay at anchor for a month before docking. Likewise, 
land travelers were kept in isolation for about forty days in a place that 
was usually outside the city walls. In 1423 Venice set up one of the first 
known lazaretto (quarantine station) on an island near the city, and the 
Venetian system became a model for other European countries (Gensini 
et al. 2004).
However, during the nineteenth century quarantine and cordons sani-
taires became increasingly contested. In many cities the mercantile 
elites staunchly opposed them. In a world where the rapid circulation of 
people and goods was increasingly crucial to commercial profit, quaran-
tine policies were regarded as old- fashioned impediments to travel and 
trade — particularly because of the wide acceptance of medical theories of 
the time that denied the contagious nature of cholera (Ackerknecht 2009). 
Moreover, the fragmentation of regulations and containment practices 
across Europe was regarded as an additional burden to commerce as well 
as an obstacle to effective control of the disease (Maglen 2003).
Driven by the need for more uniform rules, in 1851 the delegates of 
twelve governments convened in Paris to discuss the bases for common 
agreements on quarantine and the containment of cholera. Despite six 
months of negotiations, this first International Sanitary Conference did 
not produce any substantial outcomes. However, it established a platform 
for international dialogue in this area, which was further consolidated 
through subsequent meetings and negotiations. Most notably, it led to the 
adoption of the first International Sanitary Convention in 1892 and other 
international treaties in the following decades (Howard- Jones 1975).
The history of these early efforts toward international cooperation is not 
only relevant as the background of current developments in international 
health and particularly the International Health Regulations (Fidler 2005); 
it also reflects wider issues of political culture and political economy. First, 
the International Sanitary Conferences were eminently political events. 
Unlike the scientific congresses of the same period, the sanitary confer-
ences involved diplomats and other government officials, along with scien-
tists and physicians. In this unusual space for political negotiation, various 
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forms of nationalism counteracted the spirit of international collaboration. 
Agreements were often hard to achieve precisely because quarantine poli-
cies were closely associated with different national interests in commerce 
and trade protection. In addition, nationalist sentiments emerged in the 
scientific competition to conquer diseases, as the rivalry between Robert 
Koch and Louis Pasteur in the years of the Franco- Prussian War exempli-
fies (Brock 1999).
Second, a territorial and self- protective idea of Europe emerged from 
these early attempts to develop international communicable disease poli-
cies. Although cholera caused higher mortality rates in other regions of 
the world, European delegates at the sanitary conferences were primarily 
concerned with protecting the European space from what were seen as 
external threats. In particular, the Mecca pilgrimage was regarded as the 
prime cause of widespread contagion and became the target of unprec-
edented surveillance measures, despite its limited role in bringing cholera 
into Europe (Huber 2006).
Likewise, the passage in quarantine through the Suez Canal became 
a crucial strategic issue. Opened in 1869, the Suez Canal allowed water 
transportation between Europe and Asia without navigating around 
Africa. At the same time, European authorities were worried that the 
canal might be a conduit for importing cholera from India to Europe. 
This problem was debated at several conferences, and in 1892 European 
governments signed the first International Sanitary Convention to define 
common procedures concerning the passage of ships through the canal. 
This pioneering document of international health law prescribed that all 
ships were to be classified according to different risk profiles. Those with-
out any registered case of cholera could pass through the canal without 
stopping, but suspected ships could pass without inspection only if they 
informed the ports and if they had a doctor and a disinfecting machine 
on board. As Valeska Huber (2006: 467) points out, the fundamental idea 
was to create a “semi- permeable” border between the Orient and the Occi-
dent that “was open for commercial enterprises but closed for microbes 
and other suspicious elements.”
The WHO Regional Office for Europe
The International Sanitary Conferences and resulting conventions laid 
down the bases of the modern framework for international health coop-
eration. In the early twentieth century the establishment of permanent 
offices and institutions, such as the International Sanitary Bureau of the 
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American Republics (1902) and the Office International d’Hygiène Pub-
lique (OIHP) in Paris (1907), further contributed to these developments. 
In addition, in 1920 the League of Nations provided an important political 
platform to promote international efforts. While this organization was pri-
marily aimed at supporting collective security and the peaceful resolution 
of conflicts, it was also required “to take steps in matters of international 
concern for the prevention and control of disease” (League of Nations 
1920). To this purpose, its health section provided technical assistance 
to member governments, published epidemiological data and technical 
reports, and set up a number of committees on specific issues, such as 
the standardization of laboratory protocols, the prevention and control of 
malaria, and the international traffic in opium (Boudreau 1935; Howard- 
Jones 1950).
After the end of World War II, these efforts toward international coop-
eration were carried on by the United Nations and its health agency, the 
World Health Organization (WHO). WHO incorporated under its admin-
istration the former international health offices, including the International 
Sanitary Bureau (renamed the Pan- American Sanitary Organization and 
later the Pan American Health Organization), the League of Nations 
Health Organisation, the Office International d’Hygiène Publique, and 
the Conseil Sanitaire, Maritime et Quarantenaire in Alexandria, Egypt. 
Moreover, under Article 21 of the WHO constitution (WHO [1948]), the 
World Health Assembly was given the authority to issue a single set of 
binding rules on “sanitary and quarantine requirements and other pro-
cedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease,” which 
were intended to rationalize the former patchwork of twelve sanitary con-
ventions. As a result, in 1951 WHO adopted the International Sanitary 
Regulations, a new set of rules that, among other obligations, required 
member states to disclose information on four communicable diseases: 
cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, and plague. Similar to early agreements, 
these rules were partly driven by the global force of commerce — namely, 
the need to “ensure the maximum security against the international spread 
of disease with the minimum interference with world traffic” (WHO 1951: 
5). In other respects, however, the new regime of international coopera-
tion was remarkably different. Unlike the Eurocentric standpoint of the 
sanitary conventions, WHO had an explicit universalistic outlook. Indeed, 
the preamble of the WHO Constitution stated that “the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of 
every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, 
economic or social condition” and “the health of all peoples is funda-
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mental to the attainment of peace and security and is dependent upon the 
fullest co- operation of individuals and States” (WHO [1948]). Over the 
years this global commitment has been reasserted in ambitious policy 
statements such as the Declaration of Alma- Ata and the WHO Health for 
All campaign, which emphasized the need for urgent action by govern-
ments, international organizations, and health authorities to protect and 
promote the health and well- being of all people in the world (WHO 1978).
While pursuing a global agenda, since its foundation WHO has always 
operated through a decentralized system of regional offices, which are 
responsible for the implementation of health programs in six wide geo-
graphic areas: Africa, the Americas, Southeast Asia, Europe, the East-
ern Mediterranean, and the Western Pacific. In the European region, the 
WHO Special Office opened in Geneva in 1949 as a temporary agency 
to help reconstruct health services after the disasters of the war and to 
respond to tuberculosis epidemics. Several years later the temporary 
office was upgraded to the permanent Regional Office for Europe (WHO/
Europe), and the central bureau was moved to Copenhagen. As a recent 
account of these early developments documents (WHO 2010), interna-
tional cooperation was one of the main concerns of its founding direc-
tor, Norman Begg: “Europe not only had problems that needed immedi-
ate action — such as epidemics — but also needed to rebuild health care 
systems that, before their large- scale destruction, had been remarkably 
sophisticated. The best way to begin this effort to reconstruct the Region’s 
health systems so that they were better than before, he believed, was to 
bring countries together — many of which had recently been enemies — in 
a spirit of mutual cooperation” (WHO 2010:10). This approach well com-
bined with the wider set of institutional initiatives for international coop-
eration that were sustaining and shaping European reconstruction, such 
as the Organisation for European Economic Co- operation (1948), the 
Council of Europe (1949), and the European Coal and Steel Community 
(1951). These initiatives were established to foster the social and economic 
recovery of European countries, but they also had important political 
implications. On the one hand, they tried to prevent another conflict in 
Europe by creating closer links among former enemies; on the other, the 
reconstruction of Europe as a whole on the basis of democracy and with 
US backing was a way to prevent the expansion of Communism beyond 
the Iron Curtain. Indeed, the first major challenge to WHO universalism 
arose when Eastern Bloc countries resigned from WHO in 1949, resuming 
active membership only at the end of the 1950s (Lee 2009).
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Despite this shaky beginning, over the years WHO/Europe became a 
leading center for international health cooperation, providing technical 
assistance to member countries, collecting and analyzing data to inform 
public health interventions, and ensuring coherence and integration of 
regional activities with the overarching organization’s global surveillance 
system and policy agenda (WHO 1958). From the end of the 1970s to 
the present, the Alma- Ata declaration on Health for All and subsequent 
policy documents based on principles of solidarity, equity, and participa-
tion (such as the 2008 Tallinn Charter) have guided regional programs 
and activities.
In keeping with these principles, in the past two decades WHO/Europe 
has developed many programs to improve access to essential health care 
in the eastern part of the region and address the dramatic rise in health 
burdens after the collapse of the Soviet system. To this aim, the regional 
office has established new liaison offices and in the 1990s launched Euro-
health, a comprehensive plan for the development of health care systems 
in the newly independent states, including human resources, maternal and 
child health, HIV/AIDS prevention, and environmental health (Danzon 
and Litvinov 1993). In addition, the emergence or reemergence of com-
municable diseases such as diphtheria and drug- resistant tuberculosis in 
the eastern countries, as well as global threats of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) and pandemic influenza, led to new investments in dis-
ease surveillance. In 1998, for example, the regional office established 
the Computerized Information System for Infectious Diseases (CISID), 
which has substantially improved the sharing of routine information and 
alerts between research centers, institutions, and individual practitioners 
throughout the European region (MacLehose, McKee, and Weinberg 
2002).
Threats to the Union
The consolidation of European integration through the European Commu-
nity (EC) has provided another important institutional platform to shape 
communicable disease policies at the regional level. Early developments 
date back to the 1980s, when research centers in EC member countries 
sought funding from the European Commission to set up surveillance net-
works to monitor and study specific diseases at the European level, includ-
ing HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, legionella infections, food- borne infections, 
and influenza. These early initiatives contributed to the analysis of epi-
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demiological trends and health resources in a wide geographic space, yet 
their implementation highlighted many discrepancies in diagnostic crite-
ria and classification systems (Fleming and Cohen 1996; Fleming, van der 
Velden, and Paget 2003). As a result, in 1994 the heads of national surveil-
lance centers established the Charter Group, an informal advisory body to 
set up a unified framework for disease surveillance in collaboration with 
the European Commission, leading to the production of a pan- European 
surveillance bulletin (Eurosurveillance) and a high- level training program 
in field epidemiology (the European Programme for Intervention Epide-
miology Training [EPIET]) that aimed to form a cadre of senior epidemi-
ologists sharing common methods and approaches.
Since the end of the 1990s these developments have increasingly been 
absorbed into the EU’s legal and institutional framework (MacLehose, 
McKee, and Weinberg 2002; Reintjes 2008), which has considerably 
expanded the scope of early interventions. In 1998 the European Parlia-
ment and the European Council approved a formal decision to set up a 
European network for epidemiological surveillance and control (Euro-
pean Parliament and EU Council 1998). This included the Early Warning 
and Response System, which was meant to ensure rapid communication 
between member states and the commission in the event of public health 
emergencies of international concern (Guglielmetti et al. 2006). More-
over, while the actual response to public health threats largely remains a 
competence of member states, the legal bases for EC activities in this area 
have been strengthened, although in a rather unsystematic way and mainly 
through case law (McKee and Mossialos 2006; Greer 2008; Lamping 
and Steffen 2009). Finally, since 2005 the EU strategy on communicable 
diseases has been further consolidated with the establishment of the Euro-
pean Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), an indepen-
dent agency funded by the European Commission in order to “identify, 
assess and communicate current and emerging threats to human health 
from communicable diseases” (European Parliament and EU Council 
2004). To fulfill its mandate, the ECDC performs a wide range of activi-
ties, including collecting, collating, and analyzing epidemiological data; 
providing scientific opinion, training, and technical assistance to member 
states; furnishing risk assessments to the commission, the member states, 
community agencies, and international organizations; and standardizing 
data collection and reporting practices.
In many ways the establishment of the ECDC marks a further step 
toward a more centralized approach (Liverani, Hanvoravongchai, and 
Coker 2012). While former initiatives were supported by the European 
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Commission yet coordinated and managed by national authorities or 
research centers, the ECDC has gradually incorporated those functions 
into a single expert body, including maintaining the editorial office of 
Eurosurveillance, coordinating the EPIET, and managing the disease sur-
veillance networks. This development, moreover, is part of a wider EU 
system for communicable disease control, in which the European Com-
mission’s Directorate- General for Health and Consumers (DG- SANCO) 
has a mandate to coordinate member states’ operations in the event of pub-
lic health threats on the basis of ECDC surveillance and risk assessment.
How can we explain these developments? Why have EU institutions 
become increasingly proactive in this policy area given the existence of 
other platforms for international health cooperation, namely the WHO 
Regional Office for Europe? Aware that policies result from the conver-
gence of different factors and that it would be misleading to draw linear 
causal relations between “drivers” and policy making, we can identify 
a number of concomitant developments. First, the growing mobility of 
people and traded goods within the EU has facilitated the transnational 
spread of diseases and has thus required increased cooperation and the 
harmonization of surveillance procedures. This need became more urgent 
after the latest rounds of enlargement, which expanded the EU to twenty- 
seven member states (McKee, MacLehose, and Nolte 2004). Second, 
recent public health crises of international concern, such as bovine spon-
giform encephalopathy with resultant Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease (com-
monly known as mad cow disease) in the 1990s, and subsequent threats 
from SARS, bioterrorism, and highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 
provided further impetus to coordinate national efforts. But there are also 
other considerations, which once again reflect the wider context of politi-
cal economy and culture in which policy programs and interventions are 
developed.
As the EU has moved from a primarily economic to a more politi-
cal form of cooperation, the notion of “European citizen” has become 
more central to the whole project of European integration, although the 
legal and political contours of this emerging subject are still uncertain 
in terms of democratic participation. Most notably, in 1992 the Maas-
tricht Treaty institutionalized the status of “citizenship of the Union” 
to strengthen and enhance European identity and enable Europeans to 
participate more actively in the EC’s political life. In this context, health 
and safety have gained more prominence in EU activities and policy dis-
courses. This change is exemplified by DG- SANCO’s new role. Initially 
established as a technical agency to monitor the safety of traded goods, 
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over the past decade DG- SANCO has reconceptualized its mission to help 
make Europe’s citizens healthier, safer, and more confident (CEC 2005), 
including programs on disease prevention and control, the international 
mobility of patients, pharmaceutical safety, and reduction of health care 
inequalities across member countries. In addition, new strategic visions of 
EU health’s new role have been articulated. For example, in 2007 the EC 
issued the White Paper “Together for Health,” which identified the strate-
gic objective of “protecting citizens from health threats” (CEC 2007: 8), 
including epidemics, bioterrorism, noncommunicable diseases, accidents, 
and work injuries.
To be sure, the safety of Europeans has been an important driver of 
European integration since its very beginning. In the aftermath of World 
War II, the European Coal and Steel Community was established not 
only to help economic reconstruction but also to prevent another conflict 
among European states.1 However, while this goal was initially achieved 
by indirect means of economic cooperation, over the past decade it has 
become a more explicit field of policy making, with ad hoc institutional 
bodies and programs not only in public health but also in disaster man-
agement, environmental protection, and regional military security such 
as the European Political and Security Committee, the European Union 
Military Committee, and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. 
As Arjen Boin and colleagues (2006: 406) argued in a recent analysis, 
these developments suggest the emergence of a new policy space in the 
European Union: “What binds together the activities in that space is a 
common concern with protecting Europeans from harm.”
As part of this process, moreover, the understanding of “European 
Community” has gained a more pronounced territorial meaning, with a 
shifting emphasis from internal security to the importance of monitoring 
and regulating the flows of people and substances between the internal 
space of the EU and the “external world.” It is worth mentioning that this 
new level of policy discourse has emerged at a time of increasing concerns 
with border control and security, partly as a result of more porous borders 
after the collapse of the bipolar world order (Smith 2005). For example, 
in 2003 the European Council (2003: 8) adopted its first European Secu-
rity Strategy “to promote a ring of well- governed countries to the East of 
1. As the French foreign minister Robert Schumann claimed in 1950 in his declaration to the 
French National Assembly, “By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Author-
ity, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will 
lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to 
the preservation of peace” (Salmon and Nicoll 1997: 45).
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the Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can 
enjoy close and cooperative relations,” amid fears that the integration of 
acceding states could bring the EU closer to “troubled areas.” Following 
this document, the council later established the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Fron-
tex), with the mandate to coordinate the border security operations of 
EU member countries (Frontex 2010). Similar to the early International 
Sanitary Conventions, Frontex envisioned a dynamic notion of EU bor-
ders as a semipermeable barrier that is open for commerce and “bona fide 
travellers” but closed for suspicious elements:
With 42,672 km of external sea borders and 8,826 km of land borders, 
the Schengen free- movement area comprises 25 countries (including a 
number of non- EU states) enabling free internal travel for nearly half a 
billion people across the continent, with 300,000 crossings at the external 
borders in 2009 alone. The Schengen zone is a unique global phenomenon 
and the number of people crossing its external borders is expected to keep 
rising. Within this context, Frontex’s responsibility is . . . to ensure that 
the EU’s external borders remain permeable and efficient for bona fide 
travellers while being an effective barrier to cross- border crime.” (Fron-
tex 2010; emphasis added)
Recent disease surveillance and control programs bear witness to simi-
lar concerns with border control and security. After the latest rounds of 
enlargement, the EU’s frontier shifted eastward to Ukraine and Belarus 
to lengthen its existing border with Russia. Following the collapse of the 
Soviet system and the rapid economic transition, these countries have expe-
rienced a significant increase in severe epidemics, including multi – drug 
resistant tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and diphtheria, partly as a result of 
weakened national health systems (Coker, Atun, and McKee 2004). In 
the wake of these developments, the EU’s eastern frontier has become the 
new focus of public health policy and surveillance programs. In 1998, for 
example, Scandinavian countries initiated EpiNorth, a collaboration proj-
ect with the Baltic states and Russia, to improve disease surveillance in 
the whole region and protect their territories from the spread of epidemics. 
A recent assessment of the ECDC, which has become a strategic partner 
of the project, stressed that “the overall aim of the expanded EpiNorth 
project was to improve communicable disease control and communica-
tion in Northern Europe and across the border to neighbouring countries 
in order to reduce the spread of such diseases and thus safeguard public 
health in the Community” (ECDC 2008b: 5). In line with this strategy, 
countries in southern Europe recently received support from the European 
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Commission to develop the project EpiSouth for disease surveillance in 
the Mediterranean region and the Balkans. If taken together, these twin 
networks create a sort of surveillance “cushion” around the EU’s frontier 
in which infectious diseases can be detected and monitored before they 
enter the union.
It must be noted, however, that such concerns with the protection of 
European space coexist with a parallel policy drive toward improved EU 
engagement in the wider landscape of global health. In the institutional 
history of the EU, this commitment was asserted as early as 1992 in the 
Maastricht Treaty, which stated that “the Community and the Member 
States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent 
international organisations in the sphere of public health” (European 
Community 1992). More recently, “Together for Health” (CEC 2007: 6) 
recognized that “in our globalised world it is hard to separate national 
or EU- wide actions from global policy” and thus stressed the need for 
more “coherence between internal and external health policies in attain-
ing global health goals” and more support for external cooperation with 
low- and middle- income countries. In line with this agenda, since 2001 
the European Commission has been a partner in the Global Health Secu-
rity Initiative, an informal collaboration among the EU, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, established to strengthen global health preparedness and response 
to threats of bioterrorism and pandemic influenza. In the wake of avian 
influenza H5N1, moreover, the commission has developed and funded 
some projects with low- and middle- income countries, including a broad 
program for the prevention and control of highly pathogenic diseases in 
South Asia and Southeast Asia, with the assistance of WHO and in col-
laboration with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Finally, the 
existence of political platforms for cross- regional cooperation, such as 
the Asia- Europe Meeting (ASEM) process and the EU- ASEAN dialogue, 
might provide further institutional bases to support wider strategies on 
communicable disease control beyond EU borders.
Protecting Europeans?
Following this bird’s- eye overview of the history of communicable dis-
ease control in Europe, there is room for reflection on past achievements, 
future challenges, and wider implications of this process of policy devel-
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opment. As we have seen, from the nineteenth century to the present the 
European space has been the focus of different forms of international 
cooperation. The adoption of international regulations and the establish-
ment of permanent institutional bodies have contributed to the establish-
ment of a European framework for communicable disease prevention and 
control. In the process, Europe has become the unit of analysis for public 
health assessments through the collection, collation, and interpretation 
of epidemiological data and other health indicators from a large number 
of countries. Periodic reports and studies from the WHO regional office 
have produced broad comparative analyses across European countries 
(see, e.g., Matic, Lazarus, and Donoghoe 2006) and in comparison with 
other world regions (see, e.g., Coker, Atun, and McKee 2008). Similar 
efforts at the EU level have further added to this stock of information. 
In particular, the consolidation of European surveillance networks and 
their integration under a single body (the ECDC) have created a com-
mon platform for data management and analysis, which can ensure more 
coherence and sustained funding of the chain of previous project- based 
arrangements, although epidemiological analyses at the European level 
may still be biased by differences in case definitions, medical consultation 
patterns, and reporting practices (ECDC 2008a).
However, the establishment of a supranational framework for communi-
cable disease control in Europe still faces many challenges. While the EU 
has developed a solid architecture for disease monitoring and risk assess-
ment, which can help national decision makers cope with the uncertainties 
of public health threats of international concern, so far EU recommenda-
tions on risk management have not always resulted in a coherent response 
across the EU, as illustrated by the recent case of H1N1 pandemic influ-
enza. In June 2009, for example, the ECDC issued an evidence- based 
policy document advising national authorities to move from containment 
to mitigation strategies; however, most countries ignored this advice and 
insisted on containment strategies for many months (UK Health Protection 
Agency 2010a). Likewise, despite timely indications on target and prior-
ity groups for vaccination campaigns, national approaches varied greatly 
across the EU, with poor coverage and limited success in most countries 
(UK Health Protection Agency 2010b). These outcomes could be the 
result of various factors, including discrepancies in national “cultures” of 
public health, differential access to resources, or conflicts between mem-
ber states reluctant to give up their autonomy in national governance and 
the imperatives of supranational integration. In addition, the sheer size of 
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the EU — and the resulting problem of reaching consensus with a large 
number of stakeholders — poses further challenges to effective EU- wide 
coordination, especially in the middle of a crisis.
The failure to agree on establishing a European stockpile of anti virals 
illustrates other important limitations of the EU system vis- à- vis the 
autonomy of sovereign countries. In the wake of avian influenza H5N1, 
the European Commission developed plans to create a centrally managed 
pool of antivirals that could be distributed according to need in the event 
of a pandemic (CEC 2006). Regardless of the much debated public health 
benefits of vaccine and antiviral stockpiling (Keil, Schönhöfer, and Spels-
berg 2011; Nicoll and Sprenger 2011), this project had the potential to 
redress imbalances between member states and thus illustrate the added 
value of EU policy in promoting solidarity. However, despite sustained 
efforts of the European Commission and several consultations, national 
health ministers eventually failed to reach an agreement — a prominent 
reminder that the implementation of large- scale public health interven-
tions at the EU level is still very difficult given key differences in national 
needs, resources, policy prospects, and the lack of sufficient EU legal 
authority in health policy. Current plans to develop a mechanism for 
joint procurement of vaccines and antivirals might provide an alterna-
tive instrument to foster equitable access to resources, as this mechanism 
would enhance the negotiation power of participating authorities over 
pharmaceutical companies (CEC 2009). However, concerns have been 
raised that joint procurement should be carefully adapted to individual 
national needs, logistics, context, and legal framework (UK Health Pro-
tection Agency 2010b).
Finally, the relationship between the EU system and WHO is another 
key challenge and has the potential to affect future public health out-
comes. Today WHO/Europe and the EU coexist as two independent insti-
tutional structures for communicable disease policy generation and pro-
gram implementation in Europe. While considerable efforts and resources 
are expended in trying to find an aligned approach, duplication and inef-
ficiencies remain a risk. During the H1N1pandemic, for example, member 
states’ inconsistent reporting of case information to the EU Early Warning 
and Response System and WHO caused concern and frustration among 
participating authorities, resulting in higher administrative burdens. This 
situation has recently improved, at least in some areas where the two insti-
tutions have engaged in closer collaboration, such as preparedness plans 
on pandemic influenza. Further, in March 2011 the ECDC and WHO/
Europe signed a new agreement that replaces a former memorandum 
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of understanding, identifying specific areas for collaboration, including 
implementing the International Health Regulations, pandemic prepared-
ness and response, decreasing antimicrobial resistance, vaccination pro-
grams, and better coordination in disease surveillance (ECDC 2011). This 
renewed commitment is likely to improve coordination in some areas in 
which incoherence and duplications remain (Johnson, Meeyai, and Coker 
2010). In this respect, the interchange of high- level staff between the two 
organizations and the proximity of WHO/Europe headquarters (Copen-
hagen) and the ECDC (Stockholm) may further facilitate joint actions.2
Yet to some extent the two organizations have different goals and 
approaches. First, their geopolitical coverage is very different (fifty- three 
member states of WHO/Europe versus twenty- seven of the European 
Union).3 Specifically, the inclusion of the Russian Federation and former 
Soviet states in the framework of WHO/Europe may result in considerably 
different policy strategies and priorities. Second, the activities of WHO/
Europe focus on needs and public health issues at the regional level, but 
nonetheless they respond to a universalistic vision of human health and 
are embedded in the overarching organization’s overall structure, although 
some concerns have been raised in the past about the lack of WHO cen-
tral control over regional offices (Godlee 1994; Yamey 2002). Likewise, 
WHO surveillance networks in Europe are part of a wider global structure 
of data collection and early warning systems. By contrast, EU policies on 
infectious diseases are first and foremost European. Similar to the early 
International Sanitary Conventions, their main goal is to protect the Euro-
pean space from diseases. As noted earlier, in recent years EU policy 
makers have been more aware of the need to strengthen the EU’s voice in 
global health, as outlined in “Together for Health,” including enhanced 
cooperation with WHO. However, current WHO regulations are not likely 
to foster closer EU engagement at the highest institutional level because 
the WHO statute is based on a system of national sovereignties, whereby 
membership is only open to states. At present, the European Commission 
has observer status at the World Health Assembly and is on the executive 
board and the regional committees but has no rights to vote.
2. In 2010 Zsuzsanna Jakab, the founding director of the ECDC, was appointed as the new 
director of the WHO Regional Office for Europe.
3. Some initiatives, however, have a broader coverage. For instance, the Early Warning and 
Response System also includes European Economic Community members that are not part of 
the EU (i.e., Iceland, Lichtenstein, and Norway).
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Conclusions
Different framings of “Europe,” as well as contingent political and cul-
tural contexts, have provided the background for health cooperation 
among European states. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
the international sanitary conferences and conventions were shaped by the 
perceived need to insulate Europe from external threats without impedi-
ments to commerce and travel, as well as the imperative to protect national 
interests. After the end of World War II, the establishment of the WHO 
Regional Office for Europe provided a permanent institution to address 
public health issues at the regional level, in keeping with the wider spirit 
of cooperation that characterized European reconstruction. Finally, since 
the late 1980s the EU has become an increasingly important institutional 
actor for developing supranational mechanisms of communicable disease 
prevention and control as part of its new role, or at least part of its func-
tions, as guardian of Europeans’ health and safety.
The present European framework for communicable disease prevention 
and control is still fragmented across a range of diverse arrangements, 
including national policies and public health systems, bilateral agree-
ments between countries, the WHO Regional Office for Europe, and the 
new EU system. In this evolving space, EU policies have the potential to 
add great value to the efforts of member states and international organi-
zations charged with global surveillance, given the existence of a wide 
range of EU networks and connections in related policy areas and the 
unique experience of EU policy makers in supranational governance. To 
enhance effectiveness, however, the EU system should be sustained by a 
more articulated legal framework, able to more clearly improve and define 
the responsibilities of EU institutions in coordinating response to pub-
lic health threats, not just surveillance, in relation to both member states 
and WHO. More importantly, the underlying philosophy of EU activities 
should be more coherent, as the current process of policy development 
tends to be driven by two contradictory postures. On the one hand, as 
we have seen, there is a perceived need for protecting an increasingly 
vulnerable European space, with an emphasis on external threats that is 
reminiscent of the early sanitary conventions. On the other hand, this 
approach coexists with a commitment to global health and the willingness 
to contribute to a wider context of human health and well- being.
The tension between these two different stances is not only crucial to 
the field of public health but reflects one of the most important issues for 
the future of European integration. Since the mid- 1990s the question of 
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European identity has become a key topic in the academic and political 
debate on the European Union. The point of departure is the idea that 
European integration needs a common set of values to ensure coherence 
and to endow its actions with legitimacy and meaning. This need has 
become more pressing since the Maastricht Treaty, which entrusts the 
community with new and stronger competences in a wide range of areas 
such as foreign policy, security, and defense. In contributing to the debate 
and suggesting directions for the future of Europe, some social theorists 
challenged the model of a European “super state” and recognized the cos-
mopolitan potential of the EU. For example, Gerard Delanty (2005: 416) 
has argued that Europe should become a “transnational polity” engaged 
with the realization of cosmopolitan values all over the world and “new 
kinds of connectivity through which the social is constituted beyond the 
limits of national societies.” In a similar vein, Ulrich Beck (2006: 17) 
claimed that Europe should be defined by a “global sense, a sense of 
boundarylessness.” Since the process of enlargement will probably come 
to an end and the contours of the EU frontier will stabilize in the social 
and political imaginary, these questions are likely to become more central 
in the debate on European integration. For the moment it is difficult to 
predict whether the EU will evolve into a super state, characterized by a 
marked territorial meaning, or become a more experimental cosmopolitan 
polity — although once again the force of global commerce may promote 
a global outlook over a “Fortress Europe” mentality. In any case, however, 
communicable disease control will be a critical policy field in which such 
choices will be both made and reflected.
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